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TOBACCO LITIGATION AS CANCER 
PREVENTION:
DEALING WITH THE DEVIL
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
OBACCO companies have come to personify
the devil, and strategies to exorcise tobacco
smoking from the United States proliferate.
Tobacco’s demonic status is even reflected in popular
fiction. John Grisham’s latest bestseller, The Run-
away Jury, for example, is a broadside attack on to-
bacco companies. He opens the book by noting that
tobacco companies “had been thoroughly isolated
and vilified by consumer groups, doctors, even poli-
ticians.”1 This was bad, but it was getting even
worse: “Now the lawyers were after them.”1 
Physicians often see trial lawyers as predators, but
choosing sides between lawyers and big tobacco has,
at least recently, seemed easy. The American Medical
Association (AMA), for example, now endorses “all
avenues” of litigation against the tobacco companies
as a public health strategy.2 As New York Times re-
porter Philip J. Hilts puts it in a recently published
book, “The natural end for a tangle like the tobacco
wars is in court.”3 
Lawsuits against tobacco companies are not a new
phenomenon, but until 1996 they seemed singularly
impotent. Chroniclers of tobacco litigation identify
three waves of litigation.3,4 The first dates from the
time medical research first demonstrated the risks of
cancer from smoking and continued until the early
1970s (1954 to 1973). The second wave (1983 to
1992) began in the early 1980s and ended with the
dropping of the Cipollone case (the subject of a pre-
vious column5). Tobacco companies paid nothing to
claimants in any of these lawsuits, ultimately winning
them all by relying on three arguments: smoking is
the result of a free choice, there is no conclusive
proof that tobacco causes disease, and the industry
supports research on the effects of smoking on
health.3,6 The third wave, which dates from 1994, is
seen as much more likely to succeed, because of the
discovery of a vast array of previously secret docu-
ments that undercut the industry’s own arguments,
including documents indicating that the industry
knew nicotine was addictive and used this knowl-
edge to hook users.7,8 A new study that shows how
a tar ingredient, benzo(a)pyrene, causes cancer by
affecting the P53 gene is prompting tobacco com-
panies to rethink their position on causation.9,10
Moreover, while plaintiff lawyers had previously been
T
totally outgunned financially by tobacco companies
willing to pay virtually any price not to lose a case,
third-wave cases have been brought by teams of law
firms and by state attorneys general with the help of
private lawyers.7 The playing field has been leveled
to such an extent that discussions have begun on
how Congress might act to settle all tobacco lawsuits
in a fair manner.
THIRD-WAVE CLASS-ACTION SUITS
The class action that can be said to have marked
the beginning of the third wave is Castano v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co., filed on March 29, 1994, in federal
district court in Louisiana.11 Represented by more
than 60 law firms, the class seeks damages from the
tobacco companies only for the somewhat ambigu-
ous “injury of nicotine addiction.” The trial court
defined the class broadly to include 
(a) All nicotine-dependent persons in the United States
. . . who have purchased and smoked cigarettes manufac-
tured by the tobacco companies;
(b) the estates, representatives, and administrators of these
nicotine-dependent cigarette smokers; and
(c) the spouses, children, relatives, and “significant others”
of those nicotine-dependent cigarette smokers and their
heirs or survivors.11 
A “nicotine-dependent” person was defined as
any smoker “who has been diagnosed by a medical
practitioner as nicotine-dependent” or as any “reg-
ular cigarette smoker” who has been “advised by a
medical practitioner that smoking has had or will
have adverse health consequences” and who thereaf-
ter did not quit smoking.11 This is, of course, a po-
tentially giant class, comprising millions of people.
For any group to be certified as a class under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must find,
among other things, that “the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predomi-
nate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy.”12 The trial court so found,
but the case was reversed on appeal and the class de-
certified.12 
As described by the appeals court, the key to the
plaintiffs’ complaint was the “wholly untested theo-
ry” that the tobacco companies “fraudulently failed
to inform consumers that nicotine is addictive and
manipulated the level of nicotine in cigarettes to sus-
tain their addictive nature.”12 Specific allegations in-
cluded fraud and deceit, the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, violation of state consumer-pro-
tection statutes, breach of warranty, and strict prod-
uct liability.12 The remedy sought was compensatory
and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, an admission
of wrongdoing, and the use of profits for restitution
and to establish a fund for medical monitoring. The
appeals court refused to certify this as a class action,
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primarily because it believed that the trial court had
considered neither how variations in the state laws
would affect the outcome of individual cases nor
how a trial on the merits of the cases would actually
be conducted.12
Concerning the issues of state law, the appeals
court noted that “in a multi-state class action, vari-
ations in state law may swamp any common issues”
because states have different legal rules, “including
matters of causation, comparative fault, and the
types of damages available. . . .”12 Specifically, the
court noted that the members of the class had used
“different tobacco products for different amounts of
time and over different periods.”12 Knowledge of
the dangers of smoking differed from person to per-
son, as did the reason for the use of the product in
the first place. The appeals court found the idea of
millions of individual cases formidable but conclud-
ed, “Absent considered judgment on the manage-
ability of the class, a comparison to millions of indi-
vidual trials is meaningless.”12 The court stated,
“The collective wisdom of individual juries is neces-
sary before this court commits the fate of an entire
industry or indeed, the fate of a class of millions, to
a single jury.”12 This May 1996 decision was a seri-
ous blow to all tobacco-related class-action lawsuits.
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs almost immediately set
about filing separate state class actions regarding ad-
diction, and have already done so in about a dozen
states.13 
STATE REIMBURSEMENT SUITS
Potentially more important than class-action suits
are suits to reimburse states for medical costs; 19
states and more than a dozen cities, including New
York City, have sued the tobacco companies on be-
half of taxpayers to recover the share of Medicaid
costs and payments for the uninsured that are attrib-
utable to tobacco-induced disease. The states are be-
ing aided by outside private counsel working on the
basis of contingency fees. All of the state lawsuits in-
clude allegations of fraud and causing addiction, but
the claims themselves vary.14 The first case, for ex-
ample, was filed in May 1994 by the attorney gen-
eral of Mississippi, Mike Moore. The Mississippi law-
suit, which is set for trial in March 1997, rests on
theories of unjust enrichment and restitution that
are based on the claim that the state’s taxpayers have
been injured directly by the tobacco industry by hav-
ing to pay the medical costs of the illnesses induced
by tobacco products.7 
The second suit, filed by Attorney General Hu-
bert H. Humphrey III, of Minnesota, alleges that
tobacco companies committed both antitrust con-
spiracy and consumer fraud in engaging in a “uni-
fied campaign of deceit and misrepresentation” to
conceal information about addictiveness from the
public.7 In early October 1996, Humphrey filed a
newly discovered 1980 internal memorandum from
the British-American Tobacco Company, which he
characterized as “an astounding disclosure” of the
time when the tobacco companies decided to con-
tinue their “deadly cover-up” instead of admitting
the truth for the sake of their “integrity.”15 The
memo argued that acknowledging that cigarettes
cause cancer would put the tobacco companies in a
more credible position, positioning them “alongside
the liquor industry as being socially responsible, in
that we acknowledge our products can be harmful
in excess.”15 The memo also contained a warning,
“If the predictions of the U.S. lawyers are correct,
we could lose a cancer suit, and this could lead to a
new ‘industry’ in America and elsewhere, that of su-
ing tobacco companies, costing a lot of money.”15
Such evidence also strengthens racketeering allega-
tions under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), recently permitted to
proceed in Florida, which could result in triple dam-
ages against the tobacco companies.13
These cases mark the first time states have sued
anyone for having injured people for whom the
state was in turn obligated to pay medical bills.14
Robert I. Rabin of Stanford Law School has said
that given the novelty of the cases, it is impossible
to predict how they will fare, noting, “It is possible
that with all the revelations [of company wrong-
doing] there will be a much greater likelihood of
overcoming the freedom of choice argument.”14 As-
suming that one or more of these state-sponsored
reimbursement lawsuits is successful, the question
of measuring damages may be difficult. Of the
smokers who die of smoking-related illnesses, most
do not die until after they become eligible for
Medicare. Thus, the cost of their final illness (other
than long-term care expenses) is likely to be borne
not by the city or the state, but by the federal gov-
ernment. Moreover, to the extent that the individ-
ual smoker dies earlier than he or she would other-
wise have died, the federal government may even
get a net savings from Social Security and Medicare
— and also from Medicaid, which pays for nursing
home care for nonsmokers who live longer than
smokers. The extent to which federal financial bur-
dens and benefits should be factored into state-level
judgments, or whether the federal government
should itself be a party to these cases, remains to be
determined.
INDIVIDUAL-SMOKER LAWSUITS
Although class actions and state-sponsored law-
suits are the main characteristics of the third wave of
tobacco litigation, individual lawsuits have been giv-
en new life by the discovery of industry documents
— such as that uncovered by Humphrey — concern-
ing addiction, the concealment of research, and
obfuscation.3,8 For the first time, a jury awarded
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damages ($750,000) to a smoker, Grady Carter, of
Jacksonville, Florida, in August 1996 (in Cipollone,
the damages were awarded to the smoker’s spouse).16
Lung cancer developed in the 65-year-old Mr. Car-
ter after he had been smoking for 43 years. The jury
found that Brown and Williamson, the makers of
Lucky Strike cigarettes, had failed to properly warn
Carter of the risks of smoking before the time that
warning labels were required by federal law. The case
was the first in which internal Brown and William-
son documents were admitted into evidence, and
the jury seems to have been convinced that the com-
pany should have informed the public about the
addictiveness of nicotine. Interviews with three of
the six jurors revealed that two of them were angry
at what they saw as the company’s hypocritical de-
fense: the company had accumulated “reams of evi-
dence” that smoking was harmful but continued to
tell the public that the hazards of smoking were not
proved.16 The jury also seems to have been im-
pressed that Mr. Carter admitted some responsibility
for continuing to smoke (he picked a physician who
smoked so he would not be pressured by his doctor
to quit), sought a relatively small amount of money
($1.5 million), and did not ask for punitive dam-
ages.16 
In reaction to the Carter case, the stock prices of
Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco dropped 14 percent
and 13 percent, respectively, in one day, even
though these tobacco companies were not directly
involved in the litigation.16 Their stock prices later
recovered, however, and the entire industry breathed
a bit easier (and its stock prices rose) when a jury
returned a verdict for the defense in a later case, in
Indiana, in which the company’s internal documents
were not admitted into evidence.17 The Florida ver-
dict has rekindled interest in pursuing individual
lawsuits, and a string of even relatively small victories
could go a long way toward putting the tobacco
companies out of business, as their shareholders
seem to realize. Carter’s attorney, Norwood Wilner,
has another 200 cases filed and plans to bring 1 case
a month to trial.16 
POSSIBLE GLOBAL SETTLEMENTS
In March 1996 the Liggett Group, the smallest of
the major U.S. tobacco companies, offered to settle
four of the five state suits then pending and the
Castano class action. Liggett offered to pay each
state (Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and West
Virginia) $4 million over a period of 10 years and
between 2 and 7 percent of its pretax income over
24 years and to settle Castano by paying another
5 percent of pretax income for 25 years for pro-
grams to help people stop smoking.18 The company
also agreed not to give out free samples or use car-
toon characters in its ads.18 The deal was originally
proposed by Liggett’s majority shareholder, Bennett
S. LeBow, and included the right of any company
Liggett merged with to make the same deal. LeBow’s
goal was to influence RJR Nabisco’s shareholders to
vote for a merger with his company. Liggett retained
the right to withdraw from the agreement if the oth-
er tobacco companies won their suits on the merits,
and the company could terminate the Castano por-
tion if the class certification was reversed on appeal
(as it was). The deal would have cost Liggett ap-
proximately $31 million over 25 years, far less than
it would be likely to spend on legal fees.18 
Liggett did settle with five states, has agreed to
pay each $1 million, and intends to pursue settle-
ment with the other states. But the merger did not
succeed, no other company joined Liggett, and the
proposal may still unravel.19 LeBow had indicated
that his company “just can’t afford a scorched-earth
litigation policy. . . . One major judgment against
Liggett would put us out of business.”19 He contin-
ues to encourage the larger tobacco companies to
pursue a global settlement.19 
One such global-settlement proposal was floated in
August 1996 by attorney Richard Scruggs, who is
working with Mississippi’s attorney general and ap-
parently has the backing of Scruggs’s brother-in-law,
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott. Under the pro-
posal, the tobacco companies would pay about $6 bil-
lion in the form of grants to the 50 states in 1997,
with the cost for each company based on the number
of cigarettes it sells in the United States.20,21 There-
after, the manufacturers would contribute about
$100 billion over a period of 15 years — or between
30 and 40 cents for every pack sold.20 In addition to
dismissing all the state suits, Congress would take
jurisdiction over tobacco and adopt the regulations
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on ad-
vertising directed at young people as law.20,22 Juris-
diction would, however, return to the FDA if smok-
ing rates among young people failed to decline
within a specific period (the industry was said to see
this as a “deal breaker”).21 Lawsuits would be dras-
tically curtailed for the next 15 years, although spe-
cific details were not made public. Damages for pend-
ing lawsuits would be capped.23 The mere fact that
this proposal was seriously discussed for a couple of
weeks is noteworthy; it may be the basis of further
discussions in the next Congress, which is the body
that would have to enact any such global arrange-
ment for it to be effective.23 
Richard Kluger, the author of Ashes to Ashes, had
earlier suggested an alternative global settlement:
1. Congress would [grant blanket] . . . immunity to the
tobacco companies against all pending and future product
liability claims. . . .
2. The FDA would be given regulatory oversight of the
manufacture and packaging of cigarettes, including the
power to set maximum levels for their hazardous ingre-
dients.
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3. Health warning labels would be enlarged to occupy the
entire back of all cigarette packs and would carry far more
informative language.
4. . . . OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration] regulations restricting smoking at most work
places . . . and FDA [regulations regarding advertising
would be promptly implemented]. . . .
5. The federal cigarette tax would be doubled to 48 cents
to pay for enforcing these new regulations. An additional
2-cents-a-pack levy would pay for an anti-smoking adver-
tising campaign. . . .24 
It is hard to imagine that more specific or larger
warning labels would have much of an effect on
smokers, and although raising the tax on cigarettes
may discourage young smokers, it strikes hardest at
addicted low-income smokers.25 Moreover, there
seems to be no rationale for granting the tobacco
companies blanket immunity for past wrongdoings
— at least for lawsuits in which fraud can be proved.
On the other hand, limited immunity may be a
price worth paying for FDA regulatory authority
over tobacco that would have a real chance to lead
to cigarettes that are safer and contain progressively
lower levels of nicotine. Both of these settlement
proposals have serious shortcomings, but their ex-
istence is itself novel, and the search for some global
settlement is gaining ground as litigation intensifies
and the public’s disgust with the tobacco industry
grows.
The AMA recently indicated its distaste for the to-
bacco industry’s projected (and probably protracted)
litigation against the FDA’s proposed regulations
governing the access of children to tobacco products
and advertising aimed at children.22 The organiza-
tion has advised physicians to focus their antitobac-
co efforts on persuading their patients not to smoke
(and helping them quit) and on working at the state
and local level for antismoking legislation.26 This is
reasonable advice. The new chief executive officer of
RJR Nabisco, attorney Steven F. Goldstone, gave up
cigarette smoking at his physician’s insistence 17
years ago.27 Goldstone is happy, however, to have his
customers risk their health with his tobacco prod-
ucts. In his words, “Not to be too red-white-and-
blue about it, but taking risks is what this country is
about.”27 And preventing unnecessary illness and in-
jury is what public health is all about.
One risk Goldstone does not seem willing to take,
however, is that society’s increasing disgust with the
tobacco companies will hold down the price of his
company’s stock. Thus, in an October 21, 1996, in-
terview concerning third-quarter earnings, he said
he was looking for a negotiated settlement to the le-
gal war on tobacco, declaring: “I have to believe that
both the industry and Congress — no matter who’s
in Congress — will be willing to talk about it. I’m
confident President Clinton will as well.”28 
The acceptability of any global settlement will,
of course, depend on one’s goals in the tobacco
wars. Protecting individual choice while minimizing
health hazards seems reasonable, as does putting
tobacco under the jurisdiction of the Consumer
Protection Agency. The 1980 internal tobacco-com-
pany memorandums had it right: cigarettes are a
hazardous product that, like alcohol, should be rec-
ognized and regulated as such. Prohibition has not
worked and will not work, and to the extent that the
proposed OSHA workplace rules would amount to
a total prohibition on smoking in all workplaces,
they would not work either. The twin goals of re-
ducing smoking and making smoking itself less ad-
dictive and safer are laudable. The percentage of
adult tobacco smokers in the United States seems
unlikely to grow larger than its current 25 percent
and will most likely continue to decrease as the habit
becomes even more socially unacceptable. It is also
perfectly reasonable to restrict the access of children
to cigarettes and ban advertising aimed at them —
something the tobacco companies can (and should)
do voluntarily. Increasing taxes on cigarettes to fund
antismoking advertising and smoking-cessation pro-
grams also seems reasonable, although using this re-
gressive tax for other social programs (such as Med-
icaid) is unfair to addicted smokers. 
The key to public health action on the tobacco
front seems to lie in combining strategies to discour-
age children from smoking and in producing a safer
and less addictive cigarette for those who cannot, or
will not, resist the temptation to smoke. A truly
global settlement must transcend U.S. boundaries,
and a U.S. settlement should help set worldwide
standards for tar and nicotine.29 Litigation has many
problems, but to the extent that litigation has made
a global settlement at least possible, it is time to
work out reasonable terms. 
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